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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAN C. WORRALL, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
OGDEN CITY FIRE 
DEPARTMENT & OGDEN 
CITY, a Utah Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 16375 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Dan Worrall appeals from a judgment rendered 
against him and in favor of the defendant by the Second Judicial 
Court, Weber County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On October 31, 1978, trial was held in the Second Judicial 
Court of Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, Judge, sitting without a jury, presiding. Following 
a hearing in which witnesses were called, counsel for appellant 
and respondents submitted briefs to the Court, and on November 
30, 1978, the Court ruled that the plaintiff had not met the 
burden of proof in establishing that Ogden City's fire departmental 
Order #160 had no rational or reasonable relationship to a bona 
fide public purpose, and also, that the Ogden City Civil Service 
Rule requiring that an appeal of a departmental removal to the 
Civil Service Board must be filed within 5 days was valid, that 
plaintiff did not file his appeal within that time, plaintiff 
11as not entitled to the trial afforded him by the Court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Court's Order remanding 
the case for hearing by the Ogden City Civil Service Corrnnission, 
and if necessary, a new trial and eventual reinstatement as an 
Ogden City fireman. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 29, 1976, Charles J. Hansen, Chief of the 
Ogden City Fire Department, signed a letter to Fireman Second 
Class, Dan C. Worrall, giving him official notice that his 
employment with the Ogden City Fire Department was terminated 
as of November 28, 1976, due to his refusal to comply with 
General Order 160, relating to the wearing of moustaches by 
Ogden Citv firemen. The Order reads as follows: (In pertinent 
part). "to provide the best possible safety conditions, both 
from flas'h fire and respiratory aspects and to project the 
best possible public image of his uniform and Fire Department. 
The following rules will be in effect immediately .... For 
moustaches: Moustaches will not extend beyond the lower part 
of the upper lip nor will any part of the moustache be more 
than one-half inch in length." Worrall wore a handle-bar type 
moustache, neatly trirrnned, which extended below the upper lip. 
(T-13). The notice to fireman Worrall included no reference 
to any procedure available to him for further review or appeal 
of the chief's decision, or the time period in which an appeal 
should be taken. (T-10). On December 29, one month later, 
the appellant by and through his attorney, C. Gerald Parker, 
filed a Notice of Appeal with the Ogden City Manager and a 
-2-
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further notice with the Ogden City Civil Service Commission. 
On January 12, 1977, R. L. Larsen, Ogden City Manager, advised 
counsel for fireman Worrall that his appeal to the City Manager 
was denied because it was not filed within 5 days following 
appellant's discharge. On January 26, 1977, appellant and his 
attorney appeared before the Ogden City Civil Service Commission 
to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as not 
being timely under Section 10-10-21, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
and under the rules and regulations of the Ogden City Civil 
Service Commission. Said hearing was limited to only one 
question,, to-wit: Whether the appeal should not be dismissed 
as not having been filed timely. On March 9, 1977, the Ogden 
City Civil Service Commission denied appellant's appeal on the 
basis that it had not been filed in a timely manner. The Civil 
Service Commission was advised at that time by Ogden City 
Corporation counsel, Timothy Blackburn, that the Civil Service 
Commission need not concern themselves with the problems 
raised by Mr. Worrall's grievance and did not need to consider 
the effect of their denial based on the 5 day limitation because 
Worrall would have a re~edy at law through the Court to resolve 
this dispute. See Memorandum filed by defendant in support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment. On June 23, 1977, appellant filed 
suit against the respondent in the District Court. At the 
beginning of the trial on October 31, 1978, defendant moved for 
Sunnnary Judgment on the basis that appellant was not properly 
before the Court, as his appeal to the Civil Service Commission 
'0 as not timely filed. The Court took the matter under advisement 
- '1-
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but allowed the trial to proceed. (T-1). The evidence adduced 
at trial demonstrated that appellant had worn a handle-bar 
moustache for approximately 8 years prior to 1976, while an 
employee of the Ogden City Fire Depart~ent. That he had kept 
it neat and well trimmed and had never had any difficulty in 
fighting fires, in sealing his face masks, or having his facial 
hair catch on fire. (T-5). Rule 160 was promulgated by the 
Chief of the Ogden City Fire Department in 1976, and appellant 
irranediately voiced his concern to the chief, indicating he 
felt his moustache was attractive, was a part of his personality 
and personal appearance, and did not interfere with his work as 
a fireman. (T-4). That at no time was a determination ever 
made that appellant's particular moustache had ever interferred 
with his safety or the safety of others. The chief's principal 
concern seemed to be with the image of firemen and the effect 
of Worrall's continued wearing of a handle-bar moustache would 
have on that image. (T-50-51). Evidence was further produced 
by other firemen indicating that there were no health or safety 
prohl0ms with the wearine of a moustache, (T-24, T-33), althour,h, 
some individuals felt there could be a problem with the scaling 
of f?ce masks in fighting a fire with certain facial hair, and 
that this was the reason for the promulgation of the rule, 
(T-53). Evidence was also adduced that indicated that other 
individuals were also in violation of Rule 160, but were not 
disciplined as was the appellant, (T-10, T-27, T-33). The trial 
Judge, in evaluating the evidence, determined that the appellant 
had not met his burden of a proponderance of the evidence in 
-4-
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showing that the regulation had no rational basis or reason-
able relationship to a bona fide public purpose, and therefore, 
the order was presumed valid. The Judge also ruled that the 
trial of this matter should never, in effect, have taken place, 
in that the failure of the appellant to perfect his appeal 
within 5 days to the Ogden City Civil Service Commission voided 
any further proceedings, and that had the city's Motion for 
Summary Judgment been filed timely, Judgnent would have been 
granted and the matter would have never proceeded to trial. 
The Judge made no ruling regarding appellant's equal protection 
argument, in that others were not treated and disciplined as he 
was for a violation of the rule. On December 18, 1978, appellant 
filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, challenging the Court's ruling on 
the basis that it did not address the appellant's equal 
protection argument, and also in ruling as a matter of law, that 
appellant's claim was barred for failing to file a claim within 
the 5 day appeal period. Appellant's motion was heard on 
February 13, 1979, and the Judge denied the motion for the same 
reasons enunciated in the original findings. From that denial 
plaintiff appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT PROPERLY 
APPEALED TO THE OGDEN CITY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND 
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL AND REMANDED THE CASE BACK TO ·· 
-5-
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THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FOR FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS. 
In reviewing the Trial Judge's decision in this case, 
this Court, must of necessity, grapple with Section 10-10-21, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), which concerns the time limits for 
appeals from administrative decisions, and more particularly, 
serves as the basis for the time period established by the 
Ogden City Civil Service Commission, in which an employee of 
the Ogden City Fire Department, who is terminated, must appeal 
that decision to the City Kanager or the Ogden City Civil 
Service Commission. The predecesor of Section 10-10-21 was 
Section 15-9-21, Utah Code Ann. (1943), which is an identical 
statute, and which this Court considered in Vetterli v. Civil 
Service Commission of Salt Lake City, 145 P. 2d 792 (1944). 
In this case a Salt Lake City police officer left the State of 
Utah and failed to report for duty on the morning of June 1, 
1941. On June 3, 1941, the Chief of Police wrote a letter to 
the City Commission and sent a copy to the Civil Service 
Commission in which he stated, "That the officer in question was 
dismissed from service, effective May 31, 1941." The officer 
in question learned of the discharge prior to June 11, 1941, and 
on June 30, 1941, he filed an appeal with the Civil Service 
Commission. The appeal was clearly not filed within the 5 day 
period required by the provisions of the code. In spite of this, 
the Civil Service Commission heard the appeal over the objections 
of the Police Chief that the appeal had not been perfected with~ 
the time allowed by law and that the commission was without 
-6-
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jurisdiction. The decision of the Civil Service Cormnission 
was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which did not over-rule 
the Civil Service Corrrrnission's decision to hear the case even 
though the 5 day appeal period had expired. Thus, it is clear 
that this Court does not intend that the limitation periods 
prescribed by statute be so rigid that no exceptions can be 
made in reasonable cases. There are many other cases in the 
United States holding that when there has not been such a 
lengthy period of time between the time of discharge of a public 
employee and his reinstatement as to prejudice the employing 
department, then a reasonable delay in seeking reinstatement 
will not be a bar thereto. The Court should note 145 ALR 773 
as follows: 
"Generally, it must be shown that prejudice 
to the appointing power has resulted in 
order to make their delay a bar to an 
action by a discharged public employee 
for reinstatement. Thus, it has been said 
in a case of this kind that if, because of 
his delay in seeking his remedy without 
offering a satisfactory explanation for the 
delay, prejudice results to his adversary, 
one will be precluded from enforcing his 
demand. It is not so much a question of 
the lapse of time as it is to determine 
whether prejudice has resulted. If the 
delay has caused no material change in 
statu quo ante, that is no detriment 
suffered by the party pleading the latches, 
his plea is in vain." 
There has never been any evidence in the instant case showing 
that Ogden City or the fire department was in any way prejudiced 
by defendant's actions. In fact, no prejudice has resulted, the 
only one who has been damaged is the appellant himself, as he 
has been unable to work as a fireman, a vocation which he 
-7-
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followed for eight years, for a period of three years. The 
entire problem with this case essentially rests with the 
Civil Service Commission's initial decision not to hear }1r. 
Worrall' s Complaint. It should be carefully noted t~1at Mr. 
Worrall did file a Notice of Appeal 30 days after he was fired. 
This Court is well aware that this is a normal period for filing 
appeals in most judicial matters. All of the individuals 
required to be present for the Civil Service Commission to make 
a decision, to-wit; the fire chief, firemen, other experts, 
etc., could have been present at any of the Civil Service 
Commission hearings in December, 1976, or January, and March 
of 1977, when the decision was being made. They were all 
present at the trial which took place in October, 1978, almost 
two years later. Therefore, it is difficult to understand how 
the city was or could have been prejudiced by the Civil Service 
Cormnission reviewing Mr. Worrall's case. The unfortunate problem 
is that this is the type of matter which should be resolved at 
the administrative hearing level, not one which should be tried 
in the District Court and now be reviewed by this Court. Had 
a hearing on the merits been granted by the Civil Service 
Commission, the case may never have reached this level as it 
undoubtedly would have been ascertained that Mr. Worrall's 
moustache, while not directly complying with the order, was 
not interferring with his duty as a fireman, was not creating 
a hazard, and therefore, some exception or compromise, as is 
allowable in administrative proceedings could have been reached~ 
This Court is now faced with the dubious task some three years 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
later of substituting its Judgment for that of an administrative 
body. Appellant recognizes the position in which he has placed 
this Court, but also recognizes that this Court must, as the 
final arbiter of these matters, intervene when justice requires, 
to guarantee that fundamental fairness is achieved. 
There are other factors which this Court must examine 
in reviewing the 5 day statute of limitations in this particular 
case. One concerns notice. The facts are abundantly clear. 
At the time Chief Hansen fired the appellant, no notice was 
given to appellant, that he must appeal the chief's decision 
within 5 days. Some vague reference was made during the course 
of the trial, that the 5 day appeal provision is contained within 
a handbook of rules and regulations passed out to all employees 
by the department, but clearly, on the termination letter, no 
notice was given to appellant of the requirement that the appeal 
must be filed within 5 days. Appellant was not trained as a 
lawyer and was not represented by legal counsel at the time the 
termination notice was issued on November 29. He was not aware 
that any further review action or appellant procedure must be 
filed within 5 days. Due process of law requires that appellant 
should have been advised either as a part of the termination 
notice of November 29, or by other suitable means of his right 
to a further hearing and the procedure required therefore. 
This requirement is set forth in the Utah case of Entre Nous 
Club v. Toronoto, 287 P. 2d 670 (1955), wherein this Court 
stated as follows: 
"\.Jhile hearings before administrative 
-9-
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L 
bodies need not have all the formality 
of a judicial procedure, but may be 
infonnal and if suited to the matter 
involved, rather summary ... If there 
are certain elements of fair play 
required by the constitution which 
are necessary in any character of hear-
ing affecting personal or property 
rights. In respect to hearings before 
administrative bodies (as well as 
judicial tribunals), those elements 
include (1) a reasonable time and place 
for hearing where interested parties may 
attent with effort. (2) Reasonable 
notice to interested parties, and (3) 
reasonable opportunities for presentation 
of such evidence and argument as are 
appropriate to the proceedings." 
The right of a civil service employee to be notified of his 
right to appear before the commission is further set forth in 
15 Am Jur 2d, Section 40, wherein it is explained that when a 
governmental agency is seeking to discharge a veteran who is a 
men:ber of the classified civil service, the veteran "has the 
right to personally be present to present his side of the case 
to the appropriate official of the agency, and not being notified 
of his ri0 ht of personal appearance at the agency level, he must 
take such action that will constitute a clear assertion of his 
right or it will be waived." In the instant case, fireman 
Worrall was entitled to be notified of his right of personal 
appearance at the agency level. There are numerous examples 
in administrative law of advising an individual of his rights 
of review and appeal from the decision of a governmental agency. 
When a person receives his property tax assessment, he is cle:irly 
informed in writing that if he does not agree to the determinatic: 
of valuation made by the assessor, he has the right to appear oo 
-10-
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c: 
a certain date and state his objections to appeal the assessment. 
Likewise, when a person's income tax return is audited and 
additional taxes are levied, a notice of deficiency clearly 
sPts forth the date by which additional steps for review must 
be taken and the exact procedure involved. In the area of 
workman's compensation at the state level, social security 
disability at the federal level and other administrative 
hearings, the claimants are notified at every stage of the 
proceedings at such time as decisions are made, that the 
decisions may be appealed and the time frame in which the 
appeal must be taken. Recently, this Court has spoken clearly 
regarding the effect of notifying an individual before a 
statutory period of limitation can run. The case is Rose Marie 
Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, #15634, filed January 
10, 1979, in which Justice Wilkins, writing for the majority, 
stated as follows: "Similarly, where a defendant has only 5 
days to appeal, it is particularly important and due process 
requires that notice of the Judgment be given to defendant of 
his right to appeal, or his right to appeal is abridged severely. 
Despite the fact that Section 78-6-10 does not provide that 
notice must be given a defendant in a Small Claims Court action, 
we hold that Rule 73a applies to procedure in that Court as in 
other City Courts, and the time for appeal from the Court 
commences from Notice of Judgment." This was a case in which 
Default Judgment was taken in a Small Claims Court. The 
defendant was not notified of the Judgment. The Judgment was 
rlricketed and filed and the 5 day appeal time ran before defendant 
-11-
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discovered that the appeal had been taken. Justice Wilkin's 
primary concern is that notice to the party is the critical 
requirement when evaluating whether a statute of limitations 
has tolled, no matter how short. Appellant concedes that a 
5 day statute is not in and of itself arbitrary and capricious 
and unconstitutional, as this Court has ruled in Larsen Ford v. 
Silver Utah, 551 P. 2d 133 (1976). It is clear, however, that 
when statutes of limitation are of short duration that this 
Court will carefully review the circumstances surrounding the 
failure to comply with the statute by the aggrieved party. In 
this case, the city has, from the moment this dispute arose, 
attempted to use the 5 day appeals statute as a complete bar and 
has succeeded in blocking Mr. Worrall from any effec\::ive review 
of his case at the level where it should have been reviewed, the 
Civil Service Commission. 
The entire intent of civil service laws which involve 
employee-employer relations is to bring the largest ~umber of 
employees within the operation of the law and, thus, should be 
construed liberally to obtain that goal. The purpose of Civil 
Service Review Boards and administrative hearines is not to deny 
or to unduly prejudice claimants who have legitimate grievances, 
but to open the door for them and to remove this burden from the 
courts. The city's actions have completely frustrated this 
process. The Court should note 15 Am Jur 2d, p. 473, which state: 
"The purpose of the civil service law being to secure effective 
public service, the widest range is given to the application 
which should be liberally construed to bring employees within 
-12-
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its operation unless a clear exclusion is manifested by specific 
listing of the unclassified positions. 11 
The failure of the Civil Service Counnission to allow 
the appellant to fully present the merits of his case at that 
level has had a detrimental effect on all proceedings subsequent 
thereto. Under normal circumstances had the trial Court been 
faced, as it should have been, with a review of the Civil 
Service Commission's findings, the issue would have been clearly 
defined, to-wit: Did the commission act arbitrarily and 
capriciously in either sustaining or reversing the departmental 
action. Unfortunately the commission was not allowed and did 
not act on the merits of the case. The Court was thus faced 
with a confusing situation and allowed the case to proceed to 
trial, but then ruled that the case should have never been tried 
as the appeal was not properly perfected. Appellant believes 
strongly that the Judge's ruling on the 5 day appeal procedure 
casts doubt upon his consideration of the evidence in the case 
as the trier of fact. The most reasonable interpretation of 
the Judge's ruling is that the Court is saying to the appellant, 
"I am not impressed with the evidence you presented, in that it 
does not sustain your position, but even if I was, you shouldn't 
be here anyway because your case is procedurally deficient and, 
therefore, I should never have had to consider the evidence in 
the first place. 11 Obviously, this Court should be concerned with 
that reasoning. 
The Judge had the duty, at the beginning of the trial 
after a review of the pleadings at that time to sua espoute, 
-13 
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remand the case back to the Civil Service Commission and 
direct that a full hearing be held before judicial review 
of the case could take place. In the absence of the Court 
taking affirmative action in that regard, the effect of the 
Court's decision to proceed with the trial was to allow an 
evidentiary hearing as a trial de novo, at which the specter 
of a dismissal on procedural grounds was present throughout 
and which finally compelled the Court to rule thereon almost 
as an afterthought to the main decision. Thus, the Court 
erred in not remanding the case for a full hearing at the 
Civil Service Commission, compounded the error by allowing 
the trial to proceed even though a motion had been made for 
Summary Judgment based upon a procedural deficiency, and 
completed the error by ruling as a matter of law after the 
presentation of evidence, that appellant should neve~ have been 
afforded a trial. Such a scenario demands a reversal and a 
remand for a complete evidentiary hearing by the Civil Service 
Board. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON 
THE BASIS THAT THE COURT DID NOT CONSIDER 
EVIDENCE OF ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
APPLICATION OF RULE 160 AGAINST THE 
APPELLANT AS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF THE LAW GUARANTEED BY THE 14TH AMENDMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision in the inst<mt 
. 
case considered only two issues raised by appellant's ca,e. 
The first which was discussed in Point I infra concerned the 5 
-14-
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day statute of limitations. The second, concerned the Court's 
ruling that the appellant did not present sufficient evidence 
to meet the preponderance test that Rule 160 had no rational 
public purpose and, therefore, should not be enforced against 
him. Unfortunately, the Court ignored in its ruling, the other 
issue raised by appellant, which was presented at trial concerning 
whether Rule 160 was being enforced equally and fairly throughout 
the Ogden City Fire Department. Appellant concedes that this 
issue was not specifically raised in initial pleadings, but in 
subsequent Interrogatories and at the trial, the issue was clearly 
set forth in the evidence that was presented. There was uncontested 
evidence that at least two other firemen were in violation of 
Rule 160. These individuals were Clem Merrill and Lt. Todd 
Maltby. Maltby testified at the trial and indicated that not 
only were these two individuals in violation of the order, but 
many others were also in violation and, that although, they 
initially failed to comply with the order, no action was taken 
against them until after the appellant had challenged the fire 
department and Ogden City on the issue. Prior to that time, no 
such action was taken against them. No temporary suspensions were 
issued and they were not dismissed as was the appellant. No action 
was taken until 1977, subsequent to appellant challenging the 
department on the issue of the moustache. Evidence further 
established that some firemen are still not in compliance with 
Rule 160 and no disciplinary action has been taken (T-33). It 
is clear from the evidence that the appellant was for some reason 
,ingled out. Although he had been an excellent employee and there 
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had never been any difficulty with the moustache, because of 
its appearance, and because of appellant's desire to keep the 
moustache, he was "made an example." Again, this is a matter 
that should have been reviewed by the Civil Service Commission 
so that this Court would not be burdened with having to review 
it here. Unfortunately, because of the city's misguided and 
rigid adherence to the 5 day statute, the Court must now consider 
whether or not appellant was denied equal protection of the law. 
The record is clear and the evidence was uncontroverted at trial 
that arbitrariness in enforcing Rule 160 existed, yet the Judge 
remained strangely silent on that aspect of the case in his ruling. 
The silence was called to his attention in the Motion for a New 
Trial, but the Court refused to consider the issue and did not 
address it in the ruling on that Motion. Appellant's contention 
is that the Judge clearly erred in not addressing this issue in 
the Memorandum Decision, and when requested to address it in the 
Motion for a New Trial, further erred in not considering the tr~l 
testimony or reopening the case to further explore the evidence. 
The Judge's failure again demonstrates that the focus of the 
Court drifted from the facts to the procedural problems of the 
5 day notice, and once the Court determined that the case was 
not properly before it, all other issues were swept away. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court re-examine the 
record as it will find uncontested evidence of violations of the 
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment and, therefore, 
the case should be remanded so that issue can be appropriately 
considered for the trier of fact. 
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CONCLUSION 
Rigid adherence to short duration statutes of limitation 
has never been favored by this Court in the interest of justice. 
The facts of each individual case are always carefully considered 
when determining if a statute of limitation should act as a bar 
to legal redress. Appellant's case cries out to be redressed. 
This Court now has the opportunity to say to the respondents, 
Ogden City, and Ogden City Fire Department, that administrative 
procedures are there, not only to protect the administrative 
agency, but to allow a legitimate grievance to be fully and 
completely explored and analyzed before the judicial system 
becomes involved. Appellant met the intent of the law in filing 
his appeal when he did and presenting and proceeding with his 
case expeditiously. No prejudice resulted from any of his actions 
except to himself. The Trial Court should have observed this in 
the proceedings and should have remanded the case for a full 
hearing at the administrative level. The Trial Court erred further 
in allowing the trial to proceed and then ruling as a matter of 
law that the trial should not have taken place. The error was 
compounded when the Court ignored uncontested evidence of failure 
to provide equal protection of the laws in the enforcement of 
Rule 160, by the respondents. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the decision of the District Court and remand the case to the 
Ogden City Civil Service Commission for further proceedings with 
the direction that the entire matter be heard by them on the merits 
so that subsequent, judicial proceedings, if necessary, may be 
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based upon adequate administrative reviewt 
Respectfully submitted this ,,hL~ay of July, 1979. 
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